

**Political Participation of Young People in
Europe – Development of Indicators for
Comparative Research in the European
Union (EUYOUPART)**

**Deliverable 15: National report on results
of youth survey in Estonia**

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1 Description of the national sample

1.1 Social and demographic characteristics

Selection of interviewees was completed by polling company Faktum, in accordance with EUYOUNG sampling guidelines. The obtained sample was weighted on dimensions of gender and age. There is every reason to believe that the sample adequately represents Estonian youth, in terms of both social location and political attitudes.

The following table (Table 1) gives distributions of social and demographic location variables.

| | | |
|------------------------|--|-------|
| Nationality | Estonian | 87% |
| | Russian | 3% |
| | (Estonian and Russian N=2) | |
| | No citizenship | 9% |
| | Other | 1% |
| | | |
| Gender | 1 Male | 51,0% |
| | 2 Female | 49,0% |
| | | |
| Age in 4 categories | 1 15-17 years | 28,4% |
| | 2 18-20 years | 26,7% |
| | 3 21-23 years | 28,8% |
| | 4 24-25 years | 16,1% |
| Age in 2 categories | 1 15-17 years | 28,4% |
| | 2 18-25 years | 71,6% |
| Standard of Living | 1 Very low – Low | 19,3% |
| | 2 Average | 73,1% |
| | 3 High – Very high | 7,0% |
| | 77 DK – AR | ,6% |
| Type of Settlement | 1 Urban area | 44,9% |
| | 2 Small and medium city | 31,6% |
| | 3 Rural area | 23,3% |
| | 77 DK | ,2% |
| Actual Household | 1 Alone | 6,3% |
| | 2 With parent(s) | 62,4% |
| | 3 With partner | 21,5% |
| | 4 Other | 9,8% |
| Diploma (4 categories) | 1 Still student <Full maturity | 41,4% |
| | 2 Still student >= Full maturity | 26,2% |
| | 3 < Full maturity | 14,7% |
| | 4 >= Full maturity | 16,8% |
| | 77 DK – AR | ,8% |
| Gender and Education | 1 Young man active low education level(<Full maturity) | 9,6% |
| | 2 Young woman active low education level(<Full maturity) | 5,1% |

| | | |
|--------------------------|--|-------|
| | maturity) | |
| | 3 Young man active high education level (=>Full maturity) | 7,3% |
| | 4 Young woman active high education level(=>Full maturity) | 9,5% |
| | 5 Young man still at school | 34,0% |
| | 6 Young woman still at school | 33,6% |
| | 77 DK – AR | ,8% |
| | | |
| Activity Status Detailed | 1 In paid work | 28,4% |
| | 2 School | 39,0% |
| | 3 Higher studies | 21,8% |
| | 4 Unemployed | 4,9% |
| | 5 Other | 5,6% |
| | 77 DK – AR | ,3% |
| | | |
| Religion in 4 categories | 1 Catholic/Protestant/Anglican/Christian | 13,3% |
| | 2 Russian Orthodox | 20,0% |
| | 3 Other religions | 3,9% |
| | 4 No religion | 60,9% |
| | 77 DK – AR | 1,9% |

Table 1. Social and demographic characteristics of the weighted sample

2 Political interest and knowledge

2.1 Political interest and communication

A bit more than quarter of respondents (29%) reported very or fairly high level of interest in politics. This figure corresponds well to following politics in the news: 29% of respondents reported following political news every day. The finding also gives reason to present hypothetical interpretation of being ‘very or fairly’ interested in politics – it would mean following political news every day.

Among boys and girls one finds rather similar percentage of those very or fairly interested in politics (boys 28%, girls 30%); there was somewhat larger difference between categories of small interest and no interest at all, but they levelled each other.

Age category 18-25 was notably more interested: 32% against 21% in the category of 15-17 year-olds reported themselves being very or fairly interested in politics.

In rural areas percentage of those very or fairly interested in politics was notably lower than in towns: while it was 21% in villages, it was 32% both in small and larger towns and cities.

Educational attainment made real difference, percentage of those very or fairly interested was higher among those who had received full maturity diploma (41% among those who continued on educational track and 31% among those who had finished schooling). The percentage was the lowest in among people with no maturity diploma and out of schooling system (16%).

Percentage of politically interested people was the highest among students (32%), followed by employed persons (28%) and then by unemployed (20%) and other (16%).

Regarding ethnicity, one sees higher percentage of very or fairly interested people among non-Estonians (37%) than among Estonians (28%).

Regarding interest in different level of politics (Q2_1...Q2_4), similarity of distributions is evident to the naked eye. This straightforwardly leads to hypothetical conclusion that interest in politics is not differentiated by level of politics. Instead, it is differentiated by personality of the interviewee. Interest-figures do not depend on what happens locally or internationally, instead they depend on personality of the person who follows political events.

The main channel for obtaining information on politics was TV (55%); internet placed second with 29% of interviewees. Radio and newspapers were the main information source for less than 1/10 of young people.

Boys liked somewhat more internet (31% against girls' 26%). Girls preferred TV (57%, boys 52%) and newspapers (11% and 7%).

Younger age group slightly more preferred TV and internet (59% against 53% in older age group and 31% against 28%), but the differences really were small.

In rural areas, newspaper was more popular than in other settlement types: 13% against 8% in cities and 7% in towns.

Among those who already owned maturity diploma and still continued education, TV was the least popular (48%, in other categories 56%...60%) and internet was the most popular political information channel (37%). Internet was least popular in the categories of those out of education, either without diploma (12%) or with diploma (26%). Newspapers were most popular in those two categories (11% and 12%). Radio was most popular in the category of people out of education without maturity diploma (13%, 4%...7% in other categories).

Regarding activity status and favourite media channel, radio was the most used channel among unemployed people (21%). Internet was the most popular channel among students (32%). In the category other, TV and internet were virtually the only channels that were followed, with popularity of 74% and 21%.

Ethnic differences were rather small, with the only notable difference being that among non-Estonians there were a bit less newspaper readers (5% against Estonians' 9%).

Nearly half (45%) reported that they rarely or never persuaded other people to hold the same political opinions. Only 7% reported they persuaded others often or always. Though definitions of the categories are very vague, it should be rather clear that most young people do not persuade other people to hold similar political opinions as they themselves hold.

2.2 Political competence

Self-esteem of Estonian youth is rather high, nearly two thirds (64%) hold opinion that politics only sometimes, rarely or never seemed so complicated that one could not understand what was going on around.

Regarding altering social practices, most of young people reported readiness to involve themselves in changes. 82% hold an opinion that if something really bothers you, you should try to change things. Many among youth hold opinion that one should try to make world better place: 77% agrees or agrees strongly it was important to try to make world better. Involvement would be likely even if a person perceived that s/he could not bring along any improvement: 73% agreed it is important to try to change things even if one can not bring about notable change, and 61% disagreed with the statement that it was pointless to try to change things.

Majority of young people also believed that they would meet influential people in connection with socio-political activities (37%; while 29% hold the opposite opinion). Likewise, those who agreed that political activism was good for their career outnumbered those who disagreed

with the statement (57% and 15%). 48% believed they learnt something in connection with political activism, and only 17% disagreed with this statement.

So, youth showed signs of potential for political involvement, and youth perceived political activism to be useful in further life. But why then is it that youth tends to be among most inactive social categories? It seems they have got lots of other items in mind, which might be more exciting and leave not enough time and energy for political activity. 48% agrees with statement that they are too busy to be politically active, 45% agrees that they don't have enough time to be politically active and 37% agrees that they are too exhausted to be politically active. So it might be that competition between alternative activities would explain why partaking in politics was relatively rare even if young people believed they could make difference and that participation would be good for their further life.

2.3 Political knowledge

Regarding knowing correctly political facts and circumstances, majority of Estonian youth was located in categories of weak (19%) and medium-weak (39%). About one third of respondents scored medium-strong (32%) and one tenth (9%) scored strong.

Slight gender difference could be observed: there was more girls in the categories of weak and medium-weak – 63%, the same percentage for boys was 54%. And, naturally, the percentage of girls in categories of medium-strong and strong was smaller than that of boys: 37% and 46%.

The same pattern holds also for the indicator of political ignorance: one finds 75% of boys and 66% of girls in weak and medium-weak categories, and 25% of boys and 34% of girls in categories which signify high number of 'don't know' answers.

Mean for older age category was a bit higher than that of younger category: 2,4 and 2,2.

In rural areas the mean was 2,4 while it was 2,3 in other types of localities.

Regarding educational attainment, the mean value was the highest in the category of students who already obtained maturity certificate (2,5); the second and third highest means were in the categories of people with certificate and among student without certificate (both 2,3); it was the lowest among people without certificate (2,1).

Political knowledge was the lowest in the category of unemployed (1,9). It was the highest among students (2,4) and then among employed people (2,3).

There was large ethnic difference: while the mean value equalled 2,4 among Estonians it was only 1,8 among non-Estonians.

3 Political socialization

3.1 Political socialization in family

3.1.1 Parents' interest in and discussions of politics

Young peoples' impression was that fathers tended to be more interested in politics than mothers: 68% reported father were very or rather interested in politics while only 47% reported mother were very or rather interested. At the same time, percentage of young people who could not describe their father's interest was 25%, while the same figure about mother was as low as 9%.

Positive covariation between variables that describe parent's interest and interviewee's interest in politics was evident. Among those fathers/mothers who were described as being **very interested** in politics, also 49%/44% of interviewees described themselves as being very or fairly interested in politics; the figures among politically disinterested fathers/mothers were

14% and 20%. The relationship was statistically significant, respective values of Pearson Chi-Square statistics were 57 and 65 (9 degrees of freedom), likelihood of type I error << 1%. Among those fathers/mothers who were described as being **not at all interested** in politics, also 29%/33% of interviewees described themselves as being not at all interested in politics; the figures among politically very interested fathers/mothers were 9% and 4%.

On the average, less than one third reported political discussion with parents at least sometimes. 32% reported discussion of politics with father, while 28% reported discussion with mother.

Approximately one third (31%) reported they discussed politics with partner. The percentage was notably lower for sisters and brothers, only 15% reported political discussions with them.

3.1.2 Parents’ demonstrating and voting

According to survey, demonstrating was a rather rare event, nearly 9 fathers and mothers out of 10 never demonstrated. When mothers and fathers were analysed jointly, then approximately in three quarters (76%) of families parents had never partook in a demonstration. Percentage of families where both parents had demonstrated was 10%; percentage of families where only one parent had demonstrated was somewhat lower – 6%. The figures seem rather realistic, given the nature of political culture in Estonia where demonstrations take place rather rarely.

Approximately 5 to 6 fathers or mother out of 10 voted often or always. Percentage of families where both parents voted but not always, was 55%; percentage of families where both parents always voted was 28%, and percentage of families where only one parent voted was 9%. The figures seem realistic since turnout in recent national or local elections was between 50% and 60%.

3.1.3 Parents’ ideological filiations

What can be said about reproduction of ideological preferences within Estonian family? Does the presence or absence of parents’ ideological preferences influence offspring’s ability to locate him- or herself on left-right scale? If yes, then what is the nature of the relationship? Additional variable was created by counting user defined missing values for mother and father. On the next step, the variable was crossed with interviewee’s left-right position indicators q20_1 and q27.

Results show clearly positive covariation between the variables. In the category where the number of missing values for parents was high, also percentage of ‘don’t know’ responses for kids was higher. It can be concluded that level of parents’ left-right reasoning does influence offspring’s ability to think in terms of left-and-right.

| | Parents’ left-right position reported for both parents | Parents’ left-right position reported for one parent only | Parents’ left-right position not reported |
|---|--|---|---|
| Interviewee’s left-right preference q20_1: user-missing | 3% | 11% | 47% |
| Interviewee’s left-right preference q27: user-missing | 10% | 18% | 45% |

Table 2. Relationship between parents’ and offspring’s left-right positions

According to survey, the largest percentage of youth (61%) reported their ideological convictions were different from their parents' viewpoints. Approximately one tenth (10%) had determined their ideological standing while their parents had no preference of political ideology.

Altogether 13% of parents socialised their offspring into the same ideology as they themselves were; left-right breakdown: 9% of families produced a right-wing person and 4% produced a left-wing person. The opposite situation, where offspring's ideological preference was different from parents' preferences, was reported by 3% of respondents.

5% of interviewed young people had not determined their ideological preference while their parents had determined their political views.

3.2 Political socialization: peers

3.2.1 Peers' interest in and discussion of politics

One third of interviewees (34%) categorised his/her best friend into category of being very or fairly interested in politics. 9% could not describe best friend's interest in politics. Positive covariation between respondents' and their best friend's level of interest in politics was evident.

A bit more than one third (38%) reported they discussed politics with their friends or colleagues always, often or sometimes. Perfect match of the percentages gives rise to hypothesis that the percentage was generated by respondents' political discussion habits and not by the partner with whom they discussed.

3.2.2 Importance of peers' same political opinion

Altogether 14% of interviewed persons said that for them it was very or fairly important that friends hold the same political opinions as they themselves. The rest (86%) hold opinion that it was not very important or not at all important that friends got the same political opinions.

The finding gives rise to hypothesis that youth does not consider politics important, compared to friendship. Friendship bonds are of much higher value than ideological sameness. In other words, friends are made on other grounds than socio-political attitudes.

3.2.3 Peers' voting and demonstration participation

Approximately one half of interviewees (52%) reported their friend voted always, often or sometimes; one third of interviewees (35%) said their friend voted always or often. Compared to parents' voting patterns, it was somewhat lower. The reason for that finding would be that quite a large percentage of surveyed youth was under voting age (all people aged 15 to 17) and also their friends were under voting age.

Only 5% of interviewees mentioned that their best friends partook in a demonstration at least sometimes, 86% said their friend never partook in a demonstration. The finding is well in line with Estonian political culture where demonstrations, violent events, pickets are rather rare events.

3.3 Political socialization: school

About one tenth (11%) reported political discussions politics with teacher always or often; nearly one third (29%) said they sometimes discussed politics with teacher, and 60% said they rarely or never discussed politics with teacher.

The most popular mode of socio-political participation at school was partaking in students' meetings, nearly two thirds (64%) reported having participated. Approximately 2 students out of 5 (39%) had taken active role in such meeting.

One third (34%) had performed the function of speaker for class.

One fifth (22%) had been member of a student council at their school.

Approximately 1 out of 7 had participated in a protest movement at school.

Among girls participation rate was higher in all modes except participation in a protest movement or organising political event at school.

| | Boys | Girls | Overall average |
|--|------|-------|-----------------|
| Been a member of a student council | 19% | 24% | 22% |
| Had a function as a speaker for the class | 31% | 37% | 34% |
| Attended a students' meeting | 60% | 68% | 64% |
| Taken an active role in such a meeting | 34% | 44% | 39% |
| Participated in a protest movement at school | 15% | 15% | 15% |
| Organised a political event at school | 5% | 5% | 5% |

Table 3. Involvement in school-democracy

4 Ideological orientations and partisan choices

4.1 Left-right preferences

Results from recoded item q20_1 showed that 1 out of 5 (20%) young interviewees could not locate themselves on the dimension of left-right scale. In addition, half of them (53%) said they preferred neither left- nor right-wing ideology. So, altogether three quarters (73%) did not locate themselves on left-right scale. 17% said they preferred right-wing ideology; 9% said they preferred left-wing ideology.

Another left-right scale (Q27) produced similar results: 23% did not which ideology to prefer, 52% did not prefer either left or right; 16% preferred right-wing positions and 8% preferred left-wing position.

| | LRPOSI (Q20_1) | | | Q27 | | |
|-------------------------|----------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| | Boys | Girls | Total | Boys | Girls | Total |
| Don't know, refused | 20% | 22% | 21% | 23% | 26% | 24% |
| Neither left nor right* | 50% | 57% | 53% | 51% | 53% | 52% |
| Right* | 20% | 15% | 17% | 17% | 15% | 16% |
| Left* | 11% | 7% | 9% | 10% | 6% | 8% |

* Q27: left=0,1,2,3, neither...nor...=4,5,6, right=7,8,9,10

Table 4. Left-right preferences

Gender difference was there. The difference manifested itself in the ability to locate oneself on the left-right scale rather than in selecting concrete location on the scale. In the case of both questions, percentage of don't know and neither...nor ... answers was higher among girls (Table 4). This finding is in line with the earlier finding that boys tend to have higher political knowledge.

Among older individuals, percentage of DK answers was somewhat lower: 19% while it was 23% in the younger group. There was also higher percentage of right-wing proponents among older people - 19% against 13% among younger people.

Settlement type did covary with location on left-right scale: in urban areas, the percentage of right-wing preference was high 20% and neither...not percentage was low 48%. In smaller towns and villages, percentages of right-wing preferences were 14% and 16%. Neither...nor percentages were notably higher in smaller settlements: 56% and 60% respectively.

Regarding educational attainment, percentage of neither...nor answer was the highest in the category without maturity diploma (59%); the percentage in other categories was 50% to 53%. The percentage of DK answers was the lowest in the category of students with maturity diploma (15%), in the remaining categories the percentage was 21% to 23%.

Across activity categories, unemployed and other categories displayed relatively high percentage of DK, 35% and 29% respectively. Among students the percentage was 19% and among employed people 18%. Neither...nor responses were relatively least frequent among unemployed persons (42%), in other three categories the percentage was between 52% and 56%. Left-wing views were relatively more supported by unemployed people (15%), in other categories support remained between 6% and 9%. Right-wing ideologies were supported among employed people and students (22% and 16% respectively), and found less support in the categories of unemployed and other (9% and 11%).

Ethnic background made difference: among Estonians, percentage of DK was 19% against 29% among non-Estonians; neither...nor category was selected by equal percentage of group members (53%). Also percentage left-wing supporters was equal (9%). Right ideologies made the difference: percentage of supporters was 19% among Estonians and 8% among non-Estonians.

4.2 Political party closeness

Few young people felt that any political party was close to them: percentage of those reporting that some party was close or very close varied between 4% and 21%, with concrete figure depending on particular party. Two parties were more 'successful': Reform Party was perceived (very) close by 20% and Res Publica by 21%. Both are right-wing parties. Three parties that advocate for bringing in social dimension, redistribution of wealth and regulation (Centre Party, People's Party and Social-Democratic Party) received responses of being close or very close from 13%, 8% and 9% of respondents respectively. Fatherland Party, which tends to be right-wing in economic matters and conservative in citizenship/ethnic affairs, was perceived (very) close by 10% of respondents.

Each individual in the sample can be characterised by the sense of closeness to a political party. A measure was developed by counting responses 'very close' or 'close' for each individual. Those individuals who received value 0 were characterised by no sentiment of closeness to any party. Those individuals who received value 1 were characterised by sentiment of closeness to one party; value 2 indicates sentiment of closeness to 2 parties, and so forth. The indicator would signify generalised feeling of closeness toward political parties as social institutions that are parts of the working political system.

The table below (Table 5) clearly indicates that more than half of young people (54%) possess no feeling of closeness to any political party. About one quarter feel close to one party (23%) and 16% had similar feeling toward 2 parties.

| | |
|---|-----|
| 0 no party very close or close | 54% |
| 1 1 party very close or close | 23% |
| 2 2 or more parties very close or close | 23% |

Table 5. Political party closeness index

Among young men one finds higher percentage 'no close party' answers than among young women (58% and 49%); percentages of those reporting closeness to 1 or 2 parties were 5% and 2% percentage points higher among young women.

Younger youth reported higher percentage of no close party than older youth, 59% and 51% respectively.

Regarding settlement type, respondents from rural areas reported somewhat higher percentage of no close party: 57% against 52% and 53% in other settlement types. In rural areas one could observe higher percentage of closeness to 1 party (25% against 23% in other settlements) and lower percentage of those reporting closeness to 2 or more parties (18% against 25% and 24% in other areas). Such pattern is probably an outcome of Estonian party system where there is one party that clearly associates itself with rural population (People's Party).

The category of people without maturity certificate reported the highest number of no close party – 66%. The percentage was the lowest among young people still in education and already with the certificate – 45%. They also reported the highest percentage of closeness to 2 or more parties (30%), which can be taken as an indication of generally stronger feeling of closeness to Estonian political/party system. The two other categories reported intermediate percentages of no close party: 56% in the category of students without maturity certificate and 49% in the category of employed people with maturity certificate.

Regarding activity status, among unemployed person the highest proportion reported 'no close party' – 66%. In categories of students and employed persons the percentage was 53% and 52%, in the category other it equalled to 59%. The category of employed people reported the highest percentage of 1 favourite party (28%) and relatively low percentage of several favourite parties (20%). That finding can be interpreted as an indication of relatively crystallised social-political interests that lead to selection of one political party that would represent the interests.

Among Estonians, one found smaller percentage of people with 'no close party' (52%) than among non-Estonians (64%) but there was no difference regarding feelings of closeness to one or several parties.

4.3 Voting, non-voting and electoral participation

Percentage of those eligible to vote was different in last national elections and European Parliament elections, it increased from 49% to 56%. Reason for the change is probably that national elections took place one year before European elections, so part of the sample turned 18 years old during the period between the elections.

At the same time, turnout among youth decreased from 60% to 37%. In the context of overall turnout, both figures follow the general pattern: in last national elections turnout was 58%, in European elections it was 27%.

It is common to consider youth as the most inactive group in society. The survey results give less strength of the opinion, turnout among youth was at least equal to population average, possible even higher than that.

Regarding party choice in elections, one can see that Reform Party was the most popular party among youth. Also Res Publica enjoyed their support in national elections, but lost it by the time European representative were elected. Party preference was rather stable between the two elections; one can observe changed support in the case of 3 parties. Rahvaliid lost 5% percentage points of votes; the party is known for its roots in rural population. Res Publica lost 11% percentage points of its popularity among youth. The party was created couple of years ago by several wealthy businessmen, who financed young men with political ambitions. Their promise was to introduce 'New Politics' and proper public order instead of corrupted

‘old politics’ and disorder in public sphere. However, now it can be said they couldn’t ‘walk the talk’, and by the beginning of 2005 their popularity has decreased to the point that they hardly succeed to enter national parliament again (5% threshold). They did not succeed to get any of the 6 places Estonia has in European Parliament. SDE experienced unexpected (and unbelievable) success in European elections because of great popularity of their leader, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

| | Last national elections | Last European Parliament elections |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Eligible to vote | 49% | 56% |
| Voted (% eligible to vote) | 60% | 37% (N=199) |
| Party voted for | | |
| Fatherland/Pro Patria | 8% | 7% |
| Centre Party | 17% | 13% |
| People’s Party | 9% | 4% |
| Reform Party | 26% | 30% |
| Res Publica | 31% | 20% |
| Social Democratic Party | 3% | 15% |
| Single candidate | 4% | 7% |
| Other party | 2% | 4% |

Table 6. Voting in recent national and European elections

Regarding turnout in age categories, a problem can be seen (Table 7). Turnout percentage among 18-25 was 60% in last national elections and 37% in European elections. Both figures match well actual turnout figures. Turnout percentage among 15-17 year-olds was 0% in European elections (which is ok) and 14% in last national elections which makes no sense. Voting age in Estonia is 18 years so that no 17 year old, or even younger person could not vote in last national elections. The finding casts doubt over other figures of turnout in different social categories because one finds younger people also in many other categories. Additionally, voting in the last national elections was reported by some young people who did not hold Estonian citizenship (18%) (Table 8). Doubts were strengthened also by evidently faked answers to questions q13a2, q13b2 and q13b3 (Table 9). Nevertheless, an overview of turnout in various social categories is given below. It makes more sense to focus on indicators of turnout in recent elections since both questions were preceded by eligibility-filter. The indicators q13a1 and q13b1 were asked from all interviewees, so that one can expect even larger deviation from reality than in the case of q8, voting in last national elections. It would make little sense to analyse q13a2, q13a3 because of even higher probability of untrue responses and also because of too few cases in the categories.

| | | 15-17 years | 18-25 years |
|--|---------|-------------|-------------|
| Q8 Voted in the last general elections | 0 0 no | 86,5% | 39,6% |
| | 1 1 yes | 13,5% | 60,4% |
| Q11 Voted in the EP elections in June 2004 | 0 0 no | 100,0% | 63,0% |
| | 1 1 yes | 0% | 37,0% |

Table 7. Turnout in age categories

| | | No Estonian citizenship | Estonian citizenship |
|--|--------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Q8 Voted in the last general elections | 0 0 no | 82,2% | 39,5% |

| | | | |
|--|---------|--------|-------|
| Q11 Voted in the EP elections in June 2004 | 1 1 yes | 17,8% | 60,5% |
| | 0 0 no | 100,0% | 62,9% |
| | 1 1 yes | 0% | 37,1% |

Table 8. Turnout in citizenship categories

Gender differences, one can say, were virtually absent. There were differences in eligibility to vote and in turnout but the magnitude was 3 percentage points in national elections and <1 percentage point in European elections. The same was true for party preferences, with exception of one party. In both elections, Centre Party was notably more popular among girls than boys.

In the case of both elections, turnout was higher in urban areas, the difference was between 6 and 11 percentage points.

Regarding educational attainment and turnout, there was a clear covariation between educational attainment and turnout. Education below full maturity was accompanied with the lowest propensity to turn out to cast a ballot (43% in national elections and 24% in European elections), continued education after full maturity level was obtained (university students) was accompanied with the highest propensity to vote (74% in national elections and 43% in European elections). Turnout in the remaining categories was from 50% (student without full maturity) to 56% (working, full maturity) in national elections and 35% in European elections (in both categories).

Activity status variable displayed a clear pattern – turnout was the highest among students (71% in national and 43% in European elections), then among employed people (55% in national and 34% in European elections). turnout was the lowest among unemployed people (28% in national and 13% in European elections). Turnout in the category ‘other’ was similar to turnout in the category of employed people.

Turnout and nonvoting figures obtained from another question do arise doubts on validity of the figures (Table 9). Voting percentages seem more believable than percentages of protesting, either casting invalid ballot or not going to polls.

| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Ever voted | 40% |
| Voted last year? | |
| Did not vote | 18% |
| Voted once | 54% (N=192) – the figure seems believable since it is close to the number of those who reported voting in European elections |
| Voted more than once | 28% – all liars, there were only European elections last year so that nobody could vote twice |
| Ever cast invalid vote | 2% |
| Last year cast invalid vote? | |
| Did not cast invalid vote last year | 30% |
| Once | 59% (N=11) – the figure does not seem very believable since only 1 person reported s/he cast invalid ballot in European elections and there were no other elections last year. How did it come that the number of voting-protesters increased from 1 to 11? |
| Twice | N=2 – all liars, because only European elections took place last year so that nobody could cast invalid ballot twice |

| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Ever not voted out of protest | 5% |
| Last year not voted out of protest? | |
| No | 8% |
| Once | 70% - could happen only in European elections |
| More than once | 22% – all liars, because there were elections only once last year so that nobody could not vote out of protest more than once |

Table 9. Patterns of voting and nonvoting

4.4 Socio-political involvement

The first look at the table below (Table 10) shows that 2 out of 3 young people never have been involved in any of the participation modes. Actually even this seems to be underestimation because it was only writing messages or graffiti on walls that scored so high. Participation in more organised ways and in more recognised modes was significantly lower, and in the case of most of modes it remained below 10%. Contributions to political discussion on the internet would mean sending a note to newspapers' online editions or to some other news portals. In most cases, quality of such 'contributions' remains below any reasonable standards. On the positive side, this signifies that young people do read articles and news on social and political issues – otherwise they could not write a comment.

Difference between sexes depended on popularity of the particular mode: differences could be observed in the case of the most popular modes of participation. Higher percentage of girls was involved in graffiti, attending meetings, buying a product for political reasons and wearing a political badge. Only contributing to political discussion on the internet was slightly dominated by boys.

Less popular modes showed similar involvement of boys and girls.

| | Ever performed an activity (%) | | | Performed an activity last year (% among those who reported ever performed an activity) | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-------|-------|---|-------|-------|
| | Boys | Girls | Total | Boys | Girls | Total |
| written political messages or graffiti on walls | 31% | 43% | 34% | 76% | 84% | 78% |
| contributed to a political discussion on the internet | 21% | 17% | 19% | 97% | 94% | 96% |
| attended a public meeting dealing with political or social issues | 14% | 20% | 17% | 85% | 84% | 84% |
| bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons | 13% | 16% | 14% | 100% | 91% | 95% |
| worn a badge with a political message | 8% | 11% | 10% | 90% | 88% | 89% |
| signed a petition | 10% | 9% | 9% | 93% | 90% | 92% |
| participated in a legal demonstration | 7% | 7% | 7% | 82% | 94% | 88% |
| contacted a politician | 8% | 6% | 7% | 82% | 90% | 86% |

| | Ever performed an activity (%) | | | Performed an activity last year (% among those who reported ever performed an activity) | | |
|---|--------------------------------|----|----|--|------|-----|
| | | | | | | |
| boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons | 6% | 6% | 6% | 91% | 89% | 90% |
| written an article, e.g. in a students newspaper, organisation journal, or the internet | 6% | 6% | 6% | 94% | 97% | 96% |
| collected signatures | 4% | 6% | 5% | 92% | 84% | 88% |
| donated money to support the work of a political group or organisation | 5% | 4% | 5% | 94% | 100% | 97% |
| written or forwarded a letter/an email with a political content | 4% | 6% | 5% | 100% | 84% | 91% |
| distributed leaflets with a political content | 2% | 5% | 4% | 66% | 72% | 70% |
| Held a political speech | 2% | 3% | 2% | 78% | 57% | 64% |

Table 10. Involvement in various modes of socio-political participation

Regarding participation in violent actions, none was attractive to youth: in the case of all 5 modes¹, participation remained below 1%. Though it would make no sense to go into details, in comparative perspective this finding is a good bit of information on Estonian political culture.

4.4.1 Actions in a political party

When we take a look at figures that describe young people's connection to political parties, we note only 3 persons out of 50 (6%) have supported election campaign and only 1 person out of 5 (19%) has tried to convince others to vote for a candidate or a party.

Gender differences were missing, boys and girls reported similar percentages of involvement. In the table below (Table 12) we shall see that rate of political party membership among youth was lower than the percentages of campaigning and convincing. The figures indicate potential for recruiting new members to political parties and/or to their youth chapters.

4.4.2 Actions at work

Altogether 412 young people reported they had work experience in a steady paid job (42%; 43% for boys and 40% for girls). Among those, staff meeting were the most popular mode of participation in workplace democracy, nearly 1/3 had participated (29%). Approximately 1 out of 7 young workers (16%) had taken active role in a such meeting; similar percentage (15%) had organised a group to influence management decisions.

Workers' councils were less popular, approximately 1 out of 10 (9%) had voted in elections to workers' councils and approximately 1 out of 20 had been member of a workers' council. Explanation of the relative unpopularity would refer to relatively poor degree of organisation

¹ participated in an illegal demonstration; participated in a strike; participated in a political event where property was damaged; participated in a political event where there was a violent confrontation with the police; participated in a political event where there was a violent confrontation with political opponents

among employees. Trade unions and workers' councils have been established only in a few economic branches, and relatively few employees are members of such organisations. Gender differences were small but consistent, and showed somewhat higher participation rates among girls.

| | % among those with employment experience | | |
|--|--|-------|---------|
| | boys | girls | overall |
| Participated in elections for a workers' council | 8% | 9% | 9% |
| been a member of a workers' council | 3% | 5% | 4% |
| Attended staff meetings | 26% | 32% | 29% |
| taken an active role in such a meeting | 16% | 17% | 16% |
| organised a group of workers to influence a decision of the management | 16% | 13% | 15% |

Table 11. Participation in workplace democracy

4.4.3 Involvement in organizations

In Table 12 (below) one can be seen sports clubs were the most popular organisations (41%) where youth participated. It was followed by cultural organisations (26%) and youth organisations (15%). The least popular organisations were immigrants' organisations, women's organisations and anti-globalisation organisations; approximately 5% reported participation. Participation in the rest of organisations varied between 2% and 6%.

Participation in activities of an organisation was the most popular form of contact with an organisation. On the average, nearly 1 out of 20 (4,7%) reported having participated in activities of an organisation. Being enlisted as a member of an organisation was of nearly similar popularity (4,3%). Volunteering was half of the popularity of the two other connection modes, average popularity was 2,4%.

However, the averages are not very informative and might be even misleading because of large differences between organisation types.

Gender differences were present but not in the case of every organisation type. Girls tended to be more active in overall organisational membership. In particular, girls were attracted to youth organisations, youth organisations of political parties and religious organisations, charity organisations and cultural organisations.

Relatively smaller percentage of girls visited sports clubs.

| | Member | Participated | Volunteered | Reported any of the connections | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | | | Boys | Girls | Overall |
| 1 Youth organisation | 10,3% | 9,9% | 5,7% | 11,8% | 18,5% | 15,1% |
| 2 YO of a political party | 3,7% | 3,5% | 1,8% | 4,9% | 6,5% | 5,7% |
| 3 Religious organisation, incl YO | 3,5% | 3,5% | 2,2% | 4,4% | 7,5% | 5,9% |
| 4 Trade Union, including YO | 1,2% | 2,1% | 1,4% | 2,4% | 3,3% | 2,9% |
| 5 Political Party | 1,8% | 2,1% | 1,9% | 4,1% | 4,2% | 4,1% |
| 6 Environmental organisation | 1,2% | 2,7% | 2,6% | 5,5% | 4,9% | 5,2% |
| 7 Animal rights organisation | 0,4% | 1,2% | 1,3% | 1,6% | 2,2% | 1,9% |
| 8 Peace organisation | 0,4% | 0,7% | 0,9% | 1,5% | 1,6% | 1,5% |

| | Member | Participated | Volunteered | Reported any of the connections | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| 9 Human rights organisation | 0,7% | 1,5% | 1,2% | 2,7% | 2,2% | 2,4% |
| 10 Charity organisation | 1,0% | 2,6% | 3,2% | 3,7% | 6,6% | 5,1% |
| 11 Professional organisation | 1,9% | 1,2% | 1,3% | 3,2% | 2,8% | 3,0% |
| 12 Consumer organisation | 1,7% | 0,2% | 0,4% | 1,8% | 2,4% | 2,1% |
| 13 Cultural organisation | 17,2% | 19,2% | 7,1% | 18,3% | 34,3% | 26,1% |
| 14 Immigrants organisation | 0,1% | 0,2% | 0,2% | 0,1% | 0,7% | ,4% |
| 15 Womens organisation | 0,5% | 0,7% | 0,3% | 0,4% | 1,1% | ,7% |
| 16 Anti globalisation organisation | 0,1% | 0,4% | 0,2% | 0,7% | 0,6% | ,6% |
| 17 Sportsclub | 27,8% | 28,8% | 9,2% | 49,7% | 41,2% | 41,2% |
| Average | 4,3% | 4,7% | 2,4% | 6,9% | 8,3% | 7,3% |

Table 12. Organisational connections

5 Attitudes towards society, confidence in social and political institutions

5.1 Attitudes towards society

5.1.1 Living standard

The highest percentage did locate themselves in the middle category: 73% said their standard of living was 'average'. Approximately 1 out of 5 respondents (19%) described his or her standard of living as low or very low. On the other end – high or very high standard of living – we find less than one tenth of the sample (7%).

One can not observe substantive differences between boys and girls.

| | Boys | Girls | Overall |
|--------------------|-------|-------|---------|
| 1 Very low - Low | 18,9% | 19,7% | 19,3% |
| 2 Average | 72,7% | 73,5% | 73,1% |
| 3 High – Very high | 8,4% | 5,6% | 7,0% |
| 77 DK – AR | | 1,3% | ,6% |

Table 13. Self-estimated standard of living

5.1.2 Expectations on financial and material conditions in 10 years

Average values of the responses tell that young people are rather optimistic about their future, compared to their parents' current situation – averages fall near the 'much better' endpoint of the scale. Another important finding tells that there is not much difference in their expectations – youth expects fairly similar improvement in all listed spheres.

Third, no substantive differences between boys' and girls' opinions can be observed.

Fourth, interviewees were most optimistic about improvements in social security and less optimistic about increase in income.

| | Boys | Girls | Overall |
|---|------|-------|---------|
| Q30_1 Q30_1 Compared to parents now: income in 10 years | 1,83 | 1,93 | 1,88 |

| | | | | |
|-------|--|------|------|------|
| Q30_2 | Q30_2 Compared to parents now: job in 10 years | 1,97 | 1,99 | 1,98 |
| Q30_3 | Q30_3 Compared to parents now: social security in 10 years | 2,06 | 2,02 | 2,04 |
| Q30_4 | Q30_4 Compared to parents now: quality of life in 10 years | 1,93 | 1,95 | 1,94 |
| Q30_5 | Q30_5 Compared to parents now: education in 10 years | 1,99 | 1,85 | 1,92 |

Table 14. Respondents' future expectations (averages on scale: 1=much better ... 5=much worse)

5.1.3 Perceived problems

The presented problems received rather differentiated ratings. Drugs, crimes and violence, unemployment and poverty were rated as the four most important problems in Estonia. Also terrorism, reduction of welfare state and environmental pollution received average rating above 'important'.

Xenophobia and number of immigrants were clearly perceived as less important problems.

| | Boys | Girls | Overall | |
|-------|---|-------|---------|------|
| Q31_7 | Q31_7 Problem: drugs | 1,26 | 1,19 | 1,23 |
| Q31_8 | Q31_8 Problem: crimes and violence | 1,28 | 1,23 | 1,25 |
| Q31_6 | Q31_6 Problem: unemployment | 1,35 | 1,25 | 1,30 |
| Q31_2 | Q31_2 Problem: poverty | 1,50 | 1,35 | 1,42 |
| Q31_1 | Q31_1 Problem: environmental pollution | 1,57 | 1,45 | 1,51 |
| Q31_5 | Q31_5 Problem: reduction of welfare state | 1,87 | 1,78 | 1,82 |
| Q31_9 | Q31_9 Problem: terrorism | 2,15 | 1,83 | 1,99 |
| Q31_3 | Q31_3 Problem: number of immigrants | 2,43 | 2,46 | 2,44 |
| Q31_4 | Q31_4 Problem: racism/xenophobia | 2,55 | 2,47 | 2,51 |

Table 15. Importance of various problems (averages on scale: 1=very important...4=unimportant)

5.2 Political trust

5.2.1 Satisfaction with government

Young people tend to show signs of dissatisfaction with government: average rating on the scale ranging from 1=very satisfied to 5=very dissatisfied was 3,22. That value is located below scale midpoint, indicating dominance of dissatisfied people in the sample. There was no significant difference between sexes: boys' average rating was 3,24 and girls' respective number was 3,19.

It remains an open question why majority of the interviewees were dissatisfied.

5.2.2 Trust in political organizations

First, the number of 'don't know/refused' answers significantly depended on institution that was rated:

- National institutions were rated by 96%, 97% of respondents.
- European Council and European Parliament (European top political institutions) were rated by 90%, 89% of respondents.
- Greenpeace was rated by 84% of interviewees.
- Amnesty International and Attac were rated by only 55% and 42% of respondents.

Differences between boys and girls were not large but they consistently indicated that among girls one finds higher percentage of those who selected response option 'don't know' or declined to answer the question.

| | Boys | Girls | Overall |
|---------------------|------|-------|---------|
| Trust in Government | 2% | 4% | 3% |

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Trust in parties | 3% | 4% | 3% |
| Trust in Parliament | 3% | 5% | 4% |
| Trust in politicians | 2% | 5% | 3% |
| Trust in EC | 8% | 12% | 10% |
| Trust in EP | 9% | 13% | 11% |
| Trust in Greenpeace | 14% | 18% | 16% |
| Trust in Amnesty International | 42% | 48% | 45% |
| Trust in Attac | 56% | 60% | 58% |

Table 16. Percentage of ‘don’t know/refused’ in questions measuring trust in organisations/institutions

Politicians, parties and government received the lowest rating on the scale of trust. Also national parliament received rating that was below midpoint of the scale.

Both European institutions and Amnesty International received rating that was close to scale midpoint, although on the positive side of the scale. Greenpeace received the highest rating on the scale of trust.

Differences between boys and girls were not large but they were there. With the exception of Attac, girls’ responses indicated slightly higher trust in institutions.

| | Boys | Girls | Overall |
|--|------|-------|---------|
| Q51_4 Q51_4 Trust in politicians | 2,25 | 2,34 | 2,29 |
| Q51_2 Q51_2 Trust in parties | 2,33 | 2,47 | 2,40 |
| Q51_1 Q51_1 Trust in Government | 2,64 | 2,78 | 2,71 |
| Q51_9 Q51_9 Trust in Attac | 2,78 | 2,73 | 2,76 |
| Q51_3 Q51_3 Trust in Parliament | 2,70 | 2,90 | 2,80 |
| Q51_5 Q51_5 Trust in EC | 3,01 | 3,12 | 3,06 |
| Q51_8 Q51_8 Trust in Amnesty International | 3,07 | 3,10 | 3,08 |
| Q51_6 Q51_6 Trust in EP | 3,07 | 3,16 | 3,11 |
| Q51_7 Q51_7 Trust in Greenpeace | 3,31 | 3,48 | 3,39 |

Table 17. Trust in organisations/institutions (averages on scale: 1=no trust at all...5=very much trust)

6 Belongings, beliefs and values

6.1 Ways to influence decisions in society

Percentage of those, who selected ‘don’t know/refused’ option varied between 7% and 11%. Difference between boys and girls was less than 1 percentage point but it was consistently there and indicated larger number of ‘don’t know/refused’ answers among girls.

Voting was considered to be the most effective form for influencing social decisions. Above scale midpoint one finds working to get attentions from mass media, working in a political party and working in voluntary organizations.

Demonstrating and especially violent actions, riots received the lowest grades. Contacting politicians, petitioning and boycotting too were not considered very effective modes.

Estonian youth considers conventional and institutionalized modes of participation to be the most effective ways to influence social decisions.

One can observe consistent difference between boys and girls: girls tended to rate nearly any participatory mode as more effective. Participation in violent protest was the only mode that was rated more ineffective by girls.

| Boys | Girls | Overall

| | | | | |
|--------|--|------|------|------|
| Q24_3 | Q24_3 Social influence: voting | 6,00 | 6,54 | 6,27 |
| Q24_5 | Q24_5 Social influence: work to get attention from the media | 5,42 | 5,59 | 5,50 |
| Q24_1 | Q24_1 Social influence: work in a political party | 4,96 | 5,29 | 5,12 |
| Q24_2 | Q24_2 Social influence: work in voluntary organisations | 4,68 | 5,55 | 5,11 |
| Q24_8 | Q24_8 Social influence: signing petitions | 4,33 | 4,87 | 4,60 |
| Q24_7 | Q24_7 Social influence: participation in public demonstrations | 4,26 | 4,59 | 4,42 |
| Q24_4 | Q24_4 Social influence: contacting politicians | 3,81 | 4,08 | 3,94 |
| Q24_6 | Q24_6 Social influence: boycotting products | 3,00 | 3,54 | 3,26 |
| Q24_9 | Q24_9 Social influence: participation in illegal protest | 3,04 | 2,96 | 3,00 |
| Q24_10 | Q24_10 Social influence: participation in violent protest | 2,00 | 1,75 | 1,88 |

Table 18. Effectiveness of participatory forms (averages on scale 1=very ineffective...10=very effective)

6.2 Religion

‘No religion’ is the most popular religion in Estonia, 61% reported they were not religious. 20% considered themselves to belong to Russian Orthodox church; they were mainly Russian-speaking people. 13% reported themselves as following Protestant, Catholic or other Christian church. 4% identified themselves as followers of some other religion and 2% could not locate themselves on the scale.

Regarding differences between sexes, we find a pattern which indicates somewhat higher percentage of atheists among boys (65% against 57% among girls) and somewhat higher percentage of protestant or orthodox Christians among girls (15% and 22% against 11% and 18% among boys).

6.3 Identities

First it is worth to take a look at the percentage of missing answers. There were two categories which received high percentage of ‘don’t know/refused’ or ‘not applicable’ answers. Closer examination indicated that the pattern was caused by high percentage of ‘not applicable’ options. Those still at school could not answer about workplace identification and those already at work did not answer about school/university identification.

Young people identified most strongly with their family, average estimate was close to the maximum possible. Also locality where they lived was reported to be a source of feelings of strong identification. Region, school/university nationality and working place scored notably higher than Europe or world.

The finding allow conclusion that young people tend to identify themselves in immediate localities. European or global identity is not really an alternative to close surroundings.

Girls tended to report stronger feelings of identification. There were 2 exceptions: region/country and Europe where boys reported stronger feelings of identification.

| | Boys | Girls | Overall | |
|-------|--|-------|---------|------|
| Q26_8 | Q26_8 Identity: family | 4,57 | 4,76 | 4,66 |
| Q26_5 | Q26_5 Identity: (town/community) | 4,29 | 4,33 | 4,31 |
| Q26_4 | Q26_4 Identity: (region/country) | 4,16 | 4,08 | 4,12 |
| Q26_6 | Q26_6 Identity: school/university | 4,01 | 4,02 | 4,02 |
| Q26_3 | Q26_3 Identity: (countrys nationality) | 3,97 | 4,03 | 4,00 |
| Q26_7 | Q26_7 Identity: working place/company | 3,75 | 3,82 | 3,78 |
| Q26_2 | Q26_2 Identity: European | 3,37 | 3,26 | 3,32 |
| Q26_1 | Q26_1 Identity: a world citizen | 3,06 | 3,10 | 3,08 |

Table 19. Identification (averages on scale: 1=not at all...5=very strong)

6.4 What is politics

The following table presents results from indicators where relatively clear preferences could be observed. The survey results allow conclusion that politics ...

| | |
|---|-----|
| ... Is taking care of social issues | 73% |
| ... Has something to do with parties | 66% |
| ... Is solving social conflicts | 64% |
| ... Refers to parliamentary discussions | 63% |
| ... Is solving international problems | 75% |

Table 20. What politics is

Magnitude of the differences between the sexes were 4 percentage point at most, so there were no major differences in opinions of different sexes.

Regarding other statements, youth was split more or less equally into two or three groups.

Does politics refer to voting? Estonian youth is split into two opposing parts: 35% agreed and 36% disagreed with statement that politics refers to voting. 29% of the sample neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. No big differences between boys and girls.

Does politics deal with things that are important to interviewee? Interviewees were distributed nearly equally between positions of yes (29%), no (36%) and don't know (35%). No differences between sexes.

Though more than half of the sample (54%) disagreed with statement that politics was a game played by old men, the rest were split into 2 equal groups of yes (21%) and neither agree nor disagree (25%). Among girls the percentage of agreement was a bit lower (5 percentage points) than among boys.

6.5 Values

6.5.1 Punishments and obedience

Estonian youth is willing to establish more severe punishments: 52% agrees strongly or agrees that severe crimes should be punished with death penalty; 28% disagrees. 81% agrees or strongly agrees that we (here in Estonia) need more severe punishments; only 6% disagrees. Want for more severe punishments is probably associated with opinion that crimes, violence and drugs are the most pressing social problems (Table 15). Girls hold somewhat milder opinion on death penalty but there was virtually no difference on the question of whether we need more severe punishments.

Absolute majority of young people agrees strongly or agrees with the statement that children should be taught to be obedient: 68%, and there is virtually no difference between boys and girls.

6.5.2 Political values

Though many of young people subscribe to the opinion that one strong leader can do better job than parliament (30%), larger percentage does not support this idea (41%). Among girls we find smaller percentage who support this idea (26% against boys' 34%).

Estonian youth is not very fond of letting other ethnicities to come here: 42% think there is too much immigrants in Estonia and 77% disagrees with statement that Estonia should accept more refugees. Boys' and girls' opinions are fairly similar.

One third (33%) was sure that Estonia will start losing its culture while in European Union. Opposite viewpoint was held by similar percentage of youth (35%). Boys and girls hold similar opinions.

The next 2 questions give you an idea about how different can be opinions of different sexes. 24% of boys agree that women have no reason to demand more rights, and only 11% of girls agree. The difference is even bigger when one looks at disagreement percentages: 74% of girls disagree with the statement while the percentage among boys is as low as 46%. Next, one third of boys (34%) agree that there should be more women in politics, among girls, the percentage was 57%.

6.5.3 Economics

71% agrees that owners of big companies get rich at cost of their workers. Among girls, the percentage is lower than among boys (76% and 61%).

Opinions on whether state should or should not privatize all companies are split into 3 equal groups: 34% agree, 33% neither agree nor disagree and 33% disagree. Among boys there was higher percentage who agree with the statement (38%, and 30% among girls).

Do MNCs influence politics too much? Yes, according to survey results. 60% among boys and 46% among girls agree with statement that MNCs influence too much politics.

Following the idea of the previous question it is only natural that youth's opinion is that anti-globalisation fighters are right: 37% holds that opinion, while 17% holds the opposite opinion.

Youth is predominantly free-market oriented: 40% agrees that free market solves all social problems, only 16% disagrees. Among boys one finds more supporters than among girls: 45% and 34%.

Youth also tends to agree with the statement that welfare state makes people less willing to take care of themselves; the answer pattern is consistent with answers to previous statement. 34% agrees and 28% disagrees; there was not much difference between boys and girls but more boys tended to hold the opinion.

At the same time, 37% disagrees that joblessness is persons' own fault, 29% agrees with the statement. Among girls there was higher percentage of those who disagree (43% against boys' 31%).

Moreover, young people tend to think that they might need state support in order to live well: 48% disagree with statement that I don't need state support for good life, and 22% agree. Among girls, the opinion is even stronger: 53% disagrees and 19% agrees.

7 Summary of main findings

Most of the sample (70%) could be labelled politically noninterested. Gender did not make difference in political interest. Interested persons were more common in urban areas, among older persons, among more educated persons and persons still in education and among Estonians. TV was the most popular source of political information, internet was the second popular and newspapers and radio were least popular sources. Most young people did not persuade other people to hold similar political opinions, only 7% did.

Nearly two thirds (64%) hold opinion that politics only rarely seemed so complicated that one could not understand what was going on around. Most of young people reported readiness to involve themselves in changing society 3/4 agreed it was important to try to change things even if one can not bring about notable change. Relative majority believed being politically active was useful for their career. However, politics has to compete with other spheres, youth

has got a lot of items in mind so that there was only little attention and energy available to socio-political participation.

More than 40% of respondents scored medium-strong or strong on the scale of political knowledge and political ignorance. Boys' scores indicated somewhat higher political knowledge and lower political ignorance than girls' scores.

Three quarters (73%) did not locate themselves on left-right scale (reported either DK or neither...nor). Approximately 17% said they preferred right-wing ideology and 9% said they preferred left-wing ideology.

Percentage of don't know and neither...nor ... answers was higher among girls.

Among older individuals, percentage of DK answers was somewhat lower and there was also higher percentage of right-wing proponents among older people

In urban areas, the percentage of right-wing preference was relatively high and neither...nor percentage was low. Neither...nor percentages were notably higher in smaller settlements.

Percentage of neither...nor answer was the highest in the category without maturity diploma. The percentage of DK answers was the lowest in the category of students with maturity diploma.

Among students and among employed people the percentage of DK answers was low. Neither...nor responses were relatively least frequent among unemployed persons. Left-wing views were relatively more supported by unemployed people.. Right-wing ideologies were supported among employed people and students and found less support in the categories of unemployed and other.

Among Estonians, percentage of DK was lower than among non-Estonians; percentage of neither...nor answers equal. Also percentage left-wing supporters was equal (9%). Percentage of rightwing supporters was higher among Estonians.

More than half of respondents said no party was close to them, nearly quarter reported one party was close and similar proportion said 2 or more parties were close. Percentage of no close party was higher among boys, among younger people, in rural areas, among less educated people, among unemployed people and in the group of non-Estonians.

A cautionary note first: closer examination of turnout figures raised doubts that some respondents did not report participation truly.

Turnout among youth was similar to overall turnout in elections. Turnout was higher in urban areas, among more educated persons, and among students.

2 out of 3 young people never have been involved in any of the participation modes. It was only writing messages or graffiti on walls that scored high 34%. Participation in more organised ways and in more recognised modes was significantly lower, and in the case of most of modes it remained below 10%. Regarding participation in violent actions, none was attractive to youth. Higher percentage of girls was involved in graffiti, attending meetings, buying a product for political reasons and wearing a political badge. Only contributing to political discussion on the internet was slightly dominated by boys. Less popular modes showed similar involvement of boys and girls.

Only 3 persons out of 50 supported election campaign and only 1 person out of 5 tried to convince others to vote for a candidate or a party. Gender differences were missing.

Staff meetings were the most popular mode of participation in workplace democracy, 1 out of 7 young workers had taken active role in a such meeting; similar percentage had organised a group to influence management decisions. Approximately 1 out of 10 had voted in elections to workers' councils and approximately 1 out of 20 had been member of a workers' council. Gender differences were small but consistent, and showed somewhat higher participation rates among girls.

Sports clubs were the most popular organisations where youth participated. It was followed by cultural organisations and youth organisations. The least popular organisations were immigrants' organisations, women's organisations and anti-globalisation organisations.

Nearly 1 out of 20 reported having participated in activities of an organisation. Being enlisted as a member of an organisation was of nearly similar popularity. Volunteering was half of the popularity of the two other connection modes.

Gender differences were present but not in the case of every organisation type. Girls tended to be more active in overall organisational membership. In particular, girls were attracted to youth organisations, youth organisations of political parties and religious organisations, charity organisations and cultural organisations. Relatively smaller percentage of girls visited sports clubs.